Uber reported its results for the third quarter of 2026 (Q3, July to September) on 4 November, before the US market opened. Riders and customers paid $59.8 billion through the app, and growth was 20%. Free cash flow over the last four quarters reached a record $10.4 billion [1].
The day before the results, the stock closed at $66.60, 18.5% lower than at the end of 2025 [2]. The market fears robotaxis: in July, Alphabet’s Waymo announced that it would launch its own app in Austin and Atlanta. In Q3, Uber’s main business, rides, also slowed.
What Uber said
Gross Bookings are all the money riders and customers pay through the app, including the share of drivers and couriers. Revenue is the part that stays with Uber.
| Q3 2026 | Analyst expectations | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Gross Bookings [3] | $59.8bn | $59.82bn |
| Revenue [4] | $14.65bn | $14.77bn |
| Adjusted earnings per share [5] | $0.87 | $0.88 |
| Adjusted EBITDA [6] | $2.93bn | $2.96bn |
The result was in line with expectations. Adjusted earnings per share exclude revaluations of investments and legal reserves (money Uber sets aside for expected losses in lawsuits and disputes with authorities). Under accounting rules (GAAP) they were only $0.25, because Uber lost money revaluing its investments in other companies. Adjusted EBITDA is profit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, and stock-based pay to employees.
We look at Gross Bookings growth excluding currency effects. Uber does a large part of its business in foreign currencies but reports in dollars, so a strong or weak dollar would distort the picture. Excluding currency effects, Gross Bookings growth has been between 18% and 22% since Q2 2023 [3], so it is not slowing. Adjusted EBITDA has risen from $0.09 billion to $2.96 billion a quarter since the end of 2021 [6]. Of every $100 of Gross Bookings, $5.00 is now left. At the end of 2021 only $0.30 was left. Adjusted earnings per share have risen from $0.56 to $0.88 since Q4 2024 [5]. Revenue reached $14.8 billion [4], but its growth fell to 10%, mainly because of an accounting change explained below. The business and profit are therefore not losing momentum. Trips are a different story.
The outlook for Q4 2026 is slightly below expectations:
| Q4 2026 | Uber’s outlook | Analyst expectations |
|---|---|---|
| Gross Bookings | $63.25bn to $65.25bn | $64.29bn |
| Adjusted earnings per share | $0.95 to $0.99 | $1.00 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $3.13bn to $3.23bn | $3.15bn |
What has changed since the previous analysis
In the previous analysis of 23 Sep 2026 we set out the measures that would show whether robotaxis are already taking business from Uber:
| Measure | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 | What it says |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobility growth excluding currency effects | 20% | 17% | lowest in two years |
| Adjusted EBITDA / Gross Bookings [6] | 4.9% | 5.0% | margin held |
| Mobility take rate | 25.4% | 25.5% | take rate held |
| Q3 Gross Bookings outlook | $58.25bn to $60.25bn | $59.82bn | upper half |
| Q3 earnings per share outlook | $0.84 to $0.88 | $0.88 | top of range |
Four of the five measures were clearly met. Uber delivered its outlook, the margin rose and it did not cut its take rate on rides. If robotaxis were pushing down prices, it would show first in the take rate.
The most important measure is borderline: Mobility growth excluding currency effects slipped from 20% to 17%. In robotaxis, the question stays open until January 2028. That is when Waymo will launch its own app in Austin and Atlanta, where it now runs through Uber, and it will be possible for the first time to measure how many riders it takes from Uber.
Where growth comes from
Gross Bookings come from the number of trips and the value of each trip. There were 4.06 billion trips in Q3 2026. Growth was 16%, the lowest in the last five years [7]. According to the CFO, half of the slowdown compared with Q2 came from a shortage of drivers and half is arithmetic. We explain both below.
There were 215 million monthly active platform consumers, that is, people who took at least one ride or received at least one delivery in the month [8]. User growth was 14% and has fallen for three quarters in a row; in Q4 2025 it was still 18%. Uber does not explain why. In its prepared remarks it only stresses that the number of users was a record, and the full analyst call had not been published at the time of writing.
In dollars, Mobility (rides) Gross Bookings growth was 25% in Q1 2026 and 18% in Q3. Currencies did most of the difference. Without their effect, growth was 20% and then 17%, so the slowdown is three percentage points.
Management attributes it to drivers, not riders. Most of the slowdown was outside the US, where there is enough demand but too few drivers: because of higher fuel prices, tighter labor markets and competition for drivers, mainly in India, Brazil and Canada. The war in the Middle East cut growth by 0.75 percentage points. In the US, growth slowed much less. Uber is now paying additional incentives to drivers, October was better, and so management expects Mobility growth in Q4 similar to Q3.
Delivery (food, groceries, parcels) is not slowing: Gross Bookings growth was 23%, above 20% for five quarters in a row. The slowdown in trips, however, is partly arithmetic. A year ago Uber bought the Turkish delivery company Trendyol Go. In the first year its orders were all new for Uber and lifted growth. Now they are compared with last year, when Uber already had them, so they no longer lift growth.
The average value of a trip increased, but according to the CFO not because of higher prices; it was the business mix. Because drivers were scarce mainly outside the US, business there slowed more, so the US has a larger share. US trips are on average more expensive, so the average value of a trip rose. Delivery, which grows faster than rides, works the same way, as do premium rides such as Uber Black and Comfort, whose growth was about 35%.
Why profit grows faster than the business
Revenue growth was only 10%, because in the UK Uber now deducts payments to drivers from revenue; before, it showed them as a cost. This cut revenue by $1.1 billion, but not profit.
Adjusted operating income is operating income excluding legal reserves, restructuring and amortization of intangible assets from acquisitions. It deducts stock-based pay to employees.
| Adjusted operating income | Q3 2025 | Q3 2026 | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobility | $1.86bn | $2.36bn | +27% |
| Delivery | $0.81bn | $1.06bn | +30% |
| Freight | −$0.04bn | −$0.03bn | smaller loss |
| Shared costs (G&A, platform R&D) | −$0.96bn | −$1.08bn | +13% costs |
| Total | $1.68bn | $2.30bn | +38% |
The businesses earn more because they grow, while shared costs grow more slowly. Of every $100 riders pay for a ride, Uber kept $8.00 of profit. A year earlier it was $7.40, and in Delivery only $3.70. The pressure point is drivers: incentives for them will weigh on the Mobility margin.
GAAP operating income was $1.45 billion [9]. The gap to adjusted came mainly from legal reserves of $484 million, and these are not one-off. The operating margin (how much of $100 of revenue is left as operating income) over the last four quarters was 12.4% under GAAP and 14.6% adjusted.
How much cash remains
Free cash flow, cash from operations after investment in equipment, was $10.4 billion over the last four quarters [1]. After stock-based pay, $8.4 billion remains. Uber spent $4.3 billion on share buybacks this year, but only $0.75 billion in Q3 [10]. There are 3.5% fewer shares than a year earlier.
A larger part of the cash now goes into acquisitions. Uber owns 24.99% of Germany’s Delivery Hero and in July offered €41.50 per share for all shares. For the whole company that means $14.8 billion, and the deal is expected to close in the second half of 2027. To pay for it, Uber took out loans and in September issued bonds in euros for the first time. Long-term debt was between $8 billion and $11 billion from the end of 2021. In Q3 2026 it rose to $15.7 billion [11].
| One-off item | Amount | What it affects |
|---|---|---|
| Tax benefit and investment revaluation (Q3 2025) | $4.9bn and $1.5bn | Q3 2025 net income ($6.6bn) |
| Loss on revaluation of investments (Q3 2026) | $476m | Q3 2026 net income ($512m) |
| Legal and regulatory reserves (Q3 2026) | $484m | GAAP profit, not adjusted |
| Restructuring (Q3 2026) | $186m | GAAP profit, not adjusted |
| UK VAT payment (Q4 2026) | about $1.5bn | Q4 2026 free cash flow |
Return on invested capital (ROIC), after-tax profit per dollar invested, was about 28% over the last four quarters. The question is whether debt-funded acquisitions will earn as much.
Management and direction
Management shows its direction through actions. In robotaxis, Uber does not develop its own technology but connects others: by the end of the year about 700 driverless vehicles should run on Uber, and more than 2,000 by the end of 2027. With Delivery Hero it would further enlarge Delivery, which is less profitable than rides. In September, according to media reports, it announced about 3,300 job cuts. At the end of November, Jill Hazelbaker, President and Chief Corporate Affairs Officer, who has been at Uber since 2015, is leaving. According to the company, she is leaving for an outside opportunity; which one has not been disclosed.
The bear case: robotaxis and an expensive acquisition
Robotaxis can bypass Uber. Waymo will launch its own app in Austin and Atlanta and already operates alone in other cities. If owners of driverless vehicles have their own apps, Uber will be only an intermediary with lower earnings in the largest cities. It has no technology of its own.
The slowdown has already begun. Mobility growth fell to 17%, and trip growth is the lowest in five years. A shortage of drivers means higher pay and a lower margin.
Cash is going into debt-funded acquisitions. Delivery Hero costs $14.8 billion, and Delivery earns less than half of the profit of rides per $100 of Gross Bookings. Every year Uber sets aside several hundred million dollars for lawsuits and disputes with authorities, $564 million in 2025. This is a real cost, but adjusted profit, which management emphasizes, leaves it out. GAAP profit is therefore lower.
Falsification test. If robotaxis were taking riders, growth would slow mainly in US cities with robotaxis. Management says the opposite: the slowdown was mostly outside the US, and in cities with robotaxis Uber’s trips grew faster than in the US as a whole. We cannot verify this, because Uber does not publish growth by city. We can verify that Mobility trip growth was 16% and its profit growth 27%. That does not fit a rapid loss of riders.
The bull case: too few drivers, not too few riders
Demand holds up. There are 215 million users, and about 55 million people have the Uber One membership. The slowdown was where drivers are scarce, and it improved in October.
Robotaxis need demand. According to management, partners’ vehicles on Uber complete about 30% more trips a day than in the providers’ own apps. More trips per vehicle mean a lower cost per trip, so in management’s view value is shifting to whoever has the customers.
Profit grows faster than the business. Adjusted operating income had 38% growth on 20% Gross Bookings growth. Because of past losses, Uber will pay low cash taxes for several years.
What analysts think
| Analysts (S&P Global, 4 Nov 2026) | Value |
|---|---|
| Number of analysts | 50; 41 recommend buy, 8 hold, 1 sell |
| Average price target | $100.77, 51% above the $66.60 price |
| Range of price targets | from $70 to $150 |
| Expected revenue growth | 2026: +11.2%, 2027: +15.4% |
A price target is the price an analyst expects in a year. The targets were mostly set before the results.
What the price already includes
At $66.60, all shares are worth about $136.6 billion. The price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) tells how many years of earnings a buyer of the stock pays: on adjusted earnings of the last four quarters it is 21.3. Free cash flow is 7.6% of market value.
A reverse DCF takes today’s price and calculates what revenue growth per year over the next ten years that price already includes, accounting for the fact that growth requires investment. The required return is the return an investor wants per year. From 1928 to 2025, the S&P 500 index returned about 10% a year.
| Required return | Margin stays 12.4% (GAAP) | Margin stays 14.6% (adjusted) | Margin rises to 20% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8% | 6.9% | 5.1% | 1.6% |
| 9% | 9.6% | 7.7% | 4.0% |
| 10% | 12.1% | 10.1% | 6.3% |
What this means. If you expect as much from the stock as from the market, revenue growth has to be 10% to 12% a year. In 2024 and 2025 it was 18%. The price therefore expects half to two thirds of past growth.
| Ten-year scenario | Revenue growth per year | Operating margin in ten years | Annual return |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cautious | 8% | 12% | 8.3% |
| Central | 12% | 16% | 11.3% |
| Favorable | 16% | 20% | 14.3% |
The scenarios are an illustration, not a forecast. The cautious one has growth below half of the past rate and no margin improvement, the favorable one growth close to analyst expectations for 2027. On the downside the return is about 8% a year, slightly below the market; on the upside about 14%. The calculation does not include the Delivery Hero acquisition. An outcome in which robotaxis take the largest cities from Uber would give less than the cautious scenario.
A conclusion everyone has to draw for themselves
Uber’s business still grows by about 20% a year, and profit almost twice as fast. Rides slowed by three percentage points excluding currency effects. Management blames a shortage of drivers outside the US, where there are almost no robotaxis. At the same time, Uber is moving cash from buybacks into an expensive debt-funded acquisition.
Those who think the slowdown is temporary get a company whose price assumes less growth than it has had so far. Those who think robotaxis are only just arriving see a company without its own technology that ties its future to partners. The first answer will come from Mobility growth over the next two quarters, the real one in January 2028.
Key takeaways
- Gross Bookings in Q3 2026: $59.8bn, growth 20%; adjusted earnings per share $0.88, growth 35%.
- Since the previous analysis, four of five measures were met; Mobility growth slipped to 17%, the lowest in two years.
- Gross Bookings growth excluding currency effects has been between 18% and 22% since Q2 2023; of $100 of Gross Bookings, $5.00 is left as Adjusted EBITDA (end of 2021: $0.30).
- Trip growth, 16%, is the lowest in five years, and user growth (14%) has fallen for three quarters; management blames a shortage of drivers outside the US.
- Revenue growth is only 10% because of a UK accounting change that does not affect profit.
- Of $100 paid for a ride, Uber keeps $8.00 of profit (a year earlier $7.40); in Delivery $3.70.
- Free cash flow over the last four quarters: $10.4bn.
- Uber offers $14.8bn for Delivery Hero; debt has risen this year from $10.5bn to $15.7bn.
- At a 10% required return, the price includes 10% to 12% revenue growth a year; in 2024 and 2025 it was 18%.
- The ten-year scenarios give an annual return of 8.3% to 14.3%; the S&P 500 about 10%.
Key metric charts
The charts that the numbers in the text point to. Revenue, operating income, free cash flow and shares are from Uber’s Forms 10-Q and 10-K (Q3 2026 from the earnings release). Gross Bookings, Adjusted EBITDA, adjusted earnings per share, users and trips are from the earnings releases.
Notes on the data: Changes in the tables are calculated from unrounded amounts. Growth rates excluding currency effects are Uber’s constant-currency growth rates from the earnings releases; Mobility growth in dollars was 25% in Q1 2026, 22% in Q2 and 18% in Q3. Analyst expectations come from different consensus sources (according to Investing.com, revenue of Notes on the data4.67bn and adjusted earnings per share of $0.86). The full transcript of the analyst call had not been published at the time of writing; management’s explanations are from the prepared remarks. Adjusted operating income is Uber’s Non-GAAP Operating Income. Legal and regulatory reserves were Notes on the data,123m in 2024 and $564m in 2025 (Q4 2025 release). The five-year metrics in the charts are from XBRL data and 20 earnings releases; each figure from a release matches the comparison figure a year later. Uber has reported adjusted earnings per share since the Q4 2025 release. Q3 2026 is from the earnings release because Form 10-Q had not been filed at the time of writing. The decline in shares compares diluted shares in Q3 2025 (2,124m) and Q3 2026 (2,050m). Market value is the $66.60 price times 2,050m shares. ROIC is adjusted operating income for the last four quarters ($8.25bn) at a 23% tax rate, divided by invested capital on 30 Sep 2026 ($22.7bn). Reverse DCF: revenue for the last four quarters $56.5bn, ten years of the growth sought and a five-year fade to 2.5%, investment for growth through a 28% ROIC, non-operating assets of $5.9bn (cash and investments minus debt). The long-run S&P 500 return (10.0% a year from 1928 to 2025) is an Engineering Investor calculation from Damodaran’s data.
Educational content, not financial advice. The author does not urge anyone to buy or sell any security. The data are taken from the sources listed above as of 4 Nov 2026 and may change.