Nvidia’s stock closed at $173.73 on 11 November, 27% below its peak on 6 October [1]. The value of all shares fell by about $1,590 billion in five weeks. Before the market opened today, the price fell further to about $162, because according to the Wall Street Journal the board was preparing to remove chief executive Jensen Huang.

At the same time, the business is growing faster than a year ago. Revenue growth accelerated from 56% to 106% over the last year [2]. This analysis was written on the morning of 12 November, Central European time, before the results for the next quarter on 17 November and before the board’s decision. We will update it after both.

Why the stock fell

The drop came in two waves with different causes.

First wave: the election and data centers. On 5 November the stock lost 9.3%, its largest one-day fall in the last year. Two days earlier, Democrats won both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections, and data center construction was a campaign issue in some races. According to media reports, investors feared that the new majority would limit construction. Other chip and artificial intelligence stocks fell too. Nvidia announced nothing that day.

Second wave: the chief executive’s affair. On Sunday, 8 November, the board announced an independent investigation. The reason was reporting that Huang had been the target of a foreign intelligence effort. In an email to employees, Huang admitted to being unfaithful. The board wrote that it had no reason to believe that national security or Nvidia’s secrets were compromised, and that it has confidence in Huang. The investigation is led by Joon H. Kim, former acting US Attorney in New York.

On 10 November the stock lost another 5.5%; the day before, investors had filed a class action lawsuit. On the evening of 11 November, the Wall Street Journal reported an alleged second affair and preparations to remove Huang. At the time of writing there is no official decision.

How Nvidia’s business is doing

Nvidia sells chips and complete systems for data centers, where artificial intelligence models are trained and run. Its fiscal year ends in late January, so the second quarter of fiscal 2027 (Q2 FY27) is May to July 2026. The last reported quarter:

Q2Q2 FY26Q2 FY27Growth
Revenue$46.7bn$96.2bn+106%
Data Center$41.1bn$89.0bn+117%
of which large cloud providers$24.2bn$48.7bn+102%
of which other clouds, enterprises, states$16.9bn$40.3bn+138%
Operating income$28.4bn$63.7bn+124%

Data Center brings in about 93% of revenue. Gross margin tells how much of $100 of revenue is left after the cost of making the products: at Nvidia, $75. After all operating costs, $66 of operating income is left [3]. For Q3 FY27, Nvidia guided to $108 billion of revenue, 12% more than in Q2, without sales of data center chips to China.

Revenue growth was 126% in fiscal 2024, 114% in fiscal 2025 and 66% in fiscal 2026. After slowing, it accelerated again over the last year, according to the company because of the ramp of the new Blackwell Ultra generation of chips. The next one, Vera Rubin, arrives in Q3 FY27.

Where the business is vulnerable

The first risk is that there are few customers. One direct customer brought in 16% of revenue in Q2. In the first half, three direct customers together brought in 44%. Nvidia also writes that one AI research company contributed a meaningful amount of revenue by buying cloud services; it does not name it.

The second risk is that Nvidia is increasingly helping customers finance their buildout. It writes that many customers are growing faster than their balance sheets allow, so it helps them secure land, power and buildings:

Obligation (26 Jul 2026)Amount
Purchases from suppliers, mainly memory$279bn (a quarter earlier $119bn)
All commitments$366bn
Agreements with AI clouds and leases for third parties$56bn
Guarantee for data centers to be leased by OpenAIup to $105bn
Investments in other companies$90.7bn

A guarantee means Nvidia will pay if the tenant does not. For a campus in Ohio that will host only Nvidia equipment for OpenAI, Nvidia estimates that each generation of equipment could bring it $150 billion to $200 billion of revenue. If OpenAI ran into trouble, Nvidia would lose a customer and carry its obligations at the same time.

The third risk shows in the balance sheet. Customers are paying more slowly: the average time to payment rose from 45 to 60 days in one quarter, because Nvidia allowed some large customers longer terms. Inventory rose to $31.6 billion ahead of the Vera Rubin launch. Because of US export restrictions, sales of data center chips to China are below 1% of Data Center revenue.

How much cash remains

Free cash flow, cash from operations after investment in equipment, reached $127 billion over the last four quarters (Q3 FY26 to Q2 FY27) [4]. In Q2 it was $21.4 billion, against $48.6 billion a quarter earlier, because receivables and inventory rose. In the same period Nvidia spent $55.3 billion on share buybacks, and there are 2.3% fewer shares than two years ago [5]. This year it raised its quarterly dividend from $0.01 to $0.25 per share. In Q2 it issued $25 billion of bonds.

Investments in other companies distort net income: in Q2 Nvidia earned $7.8 billion on them. That is why GAAP earnings per share were $2.46, while adjusted earnings per share, which among other things leave these gains out, were $2.22. Return on invested capital (ROIC) tells how much after-tax profit each dollar invested in the business produces. At Nvidia it is about 142% a year, because it needs almost no factories of its own: its chips are made by Taiwan’s TSMC.

How the affair could affect the business

Little changes right away. Q3 FY27 ended on 25 October, so its revenue has already been earned. Products, orders and commitments to suppliers remain, and Vera Rubin is on schedule. The affair would affect the business only if relationships with customers, the government or key people were shaken.

There are three risks here. The first is leadership. Huang co-founded Nvidia in 1993 and has run it as chief executive ever since. The board has not named a successor. According to media reports, it is looking for candidates with an outside firm, and some directors reportedly favor chief financial officer Colette Kress as interim chief executive.

The second is the government. Nvidia needs export licenses and good relations with the US government. The foreign intelligence story and the new Democratic majority in Congress could bring hearings and closer scrutiny, although the board says it has no reason to believe secrets were compromised. The third is legal costs from the investors’ class action.

The bear case: the top of the cycle and leadership risk

The AI investment cycle is nearing its peak. Nvidia’s revenue depends on a handful of customers who increasingly finance their buildout with debt and with Nvidia’s help: guarantees, longer payment terms and investments. These are signs of a late stage in the cycle. Nvidia has lived through a drop in demand before: in fiscal 2023 revenue did not grow, and the stock lost about 63% from the end of 2021 to the autumn of 2022.

Competition is pressing on margins. Google sells its own TPU chips to other companies, and Anthropic has committed to spend at least $114.5 billion with Google. Other large cloud providers are developing their own chips too. Bears argue that a 75% gross margin is possible only while customers have no real alternative.

Politics and leadership. The new majority could limit data center construction, and China brings in almost no data center revenue anymore. The departure of the founder without a successor in place would add uncertainty just when commitments are at their largest.

Falsification test. If the cycle were already turning, Nvidia would guide to lower revenue. The Q3 guidance is 12% above Q2, which argues against it. Rising inventory and longer payment terms, however, are a warning that the 17 November results will confirm or refute.

The bull case: demand is accelerating, the price has fallen

Demand is growing ever faster. Revenue growth accelerated from 56% to 106% in one year, and the Q3 guidance is $108 billion. Customers are announcing even more investment: Alphabet will spend $195 billion to $205 billion on equipment this year and, according to its chief financial officer, “significantly” more next year.

Nvidia sells more than chips. It sells complete systems with networking and software that developers have built on for years. Bulls argue that this is exactly what gives it a margin competitors do not have.

The affair does not change orders. The company is run by a broader team, and in the first half customers prepaid $15.6 billion for future deliveries. The price is now lower: on the earnings per share expected for this fiscal year, the price-to-earnings ratio is 18.6, and 10.9 for next year.

What analysts think

Analysts (S&P Global, 12 Nov 2026)Value
Number of analysts62; 55 recommend buy, 6 hold, 1 sell
Average price target$311.51, 79% above the $173.73 price
Range of price targetsfrom $180 to $515
Expected revenueFY27: $412bn (+91%), FY28: $692bn (+68%)

A price target is the price an analyst expects in a year. Most targets were set before the affair. Today two analysts cut their recommendation to hold, and Stifel cut its target from $315 to $205. Six analysts now recommend hold, against only two in October.

A conclusion everyone has to draw for themselves

The stock fell because of two things that have nothing to do with the latest numbers: post-election fear and the chief executive’s affair. Up to the last report, the business has been growing ever faster, with an exceptional margin. Beneath the surface, however, there are signs to take seriously: a handful of customers, record commitments, the guarantee for OpenAI and slower payments from customers.

Those who think demand for artificial intelligence is only halfway along get Nvidia today a quarter cheaper than in October, although the latest reported numbers have not worsened. Those who think the cycle is at its peak see a company increasingly tied to the fate of its customers, and leadership in uncertainty. The first answers will come from the 17 November results and the board’s decision on Huang.

Key takeaways

  • The stock has fallen 27% from its 6 Oct peak to $173.73; 5 Nov −9.3% after the election, 10 Nov −5.5% over the board investigation.
  • The board is investigating reports that Huang was the target of a foreign intelligence effort; according to the WSJ it is weighing his removal, with no official decision yet.
  • Revenue in Q2 FY27 (May to July 2026): $96.2bn, growth 106%; Data Center $89.0bn.
  • Revenue growth accelerated from 56% to 106% in one year; Q3 FY27 guidance is $108bn.
  • Gross margin 75%, ROIC about 142%; free cash flow over the last four quarters $127bn.
  • Three customers brought in 44% of revenue in the first half.
  • Commitments of $366bn and a guarantee of up to $105bn for OpenAI’s data centers; time to customer payment up from 45 to 60 days.
  • Analysts: 62, average target $311.51; after the affair the first cut targets and recommendations.

Key metric charts

The charts that the numbers in the text point to. Quarterly metrics for the last five years are from Nvidia’s Forms 10-Q and 10-K; quarters follow Nvidia’s fiscal year.

Nvidia: share price over the last 12 months Daily closing prices, USD 140170200230260peak $239.245 Nov: after the election −9.3%$173.7311 Nov 2026−27.4% from peakNov 2025Jan 2026Apr 2026Jul 2026Oct 2026
Revenue by quarter Last five years; top: revenue, $bn; bottom: revenue growth 0255075100Q3 FY22: $7.1bnQ4 FY22: $7.6bnQ1 FY23: $8.3bnQ2 FY23: $6.7bnQ3 FY23: $5.9bnQ4 FY23: $6.1bnQ1 FY24: $7.2bnQ2 FY24: $13.5bnQ3 FY24: $18.1bnQ4 FY24: $22.1bnQ1 FY25: $26.0bnQ2 FY25: $30.0bnQ3 FY25: $35.1bnQ4 FY25: $39.3bnQ1 FY26: $44.1bnQ2 FY26: $46.7bnQ3 FY26: $57.0bnQ4 FY26: $68.1bnQ1 FY27: $81.6bnQ2 FY27: $96.2bn96.27.1Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27Revenue growth on the same quarter a year earlier−100%0%100%200%300%Q4 FY22: 52.8%Q1 FY23: 46.4%Q2 FY23: 3.0%Q3 FY23: −16.5%Q4 FY23: −20.8%Q1 FY24: −13.2%Q2 FY24: 101.5%Q3 FY24: 205.5%Q4 FY24: 265.3%Q1 FY25: 262.1%Q2 FY25: 122.4%Q3 FY25: 93.6%Q4 FY25: 77.9%Q1 FY26: 69.2%Q2 FY26: 55.6%Q3 FY26: 62.5%Q4 FY26: 73.2%Q1 FY27: 85.2%Q2 FY27: 105.9%105.9%52.8%265.3%−20.8%Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27 Quarters follow Nvidia's fiscal year, which ends in late January (Q2 FY27 = May to July 2026).
Operating income by quarter Last five years; top: operating income, $bn; bottom: operating margin 020406080Q3 FY22: $2.67bnQ4 FY22: $2.97bnQ1 FY23: $1.87bnQ2 FY23: $0.50bnQ3 FY23: $0.60bnQ4 FY23: $1.26bnQ1 FY24: $2.14bnQ2 FY24: $6.80bnQ3 FY24: $10.42bnQ4 FY24: $13.61bnQ1 FY25: $16.91bnQ2 FY25: $18.64bnQ3 FY25: $21.87bnQ4 FY25: $24.03bnQ1 FY26: $21.64bnQ2 FY26: $28.44bnQ3 FY26: $36.01bnQ4 FY26: $44.30bnQ1 FY27: $53.54bnQ2 FY27: $63.73bn63.732.67Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27Operating margin: how much of each $100 of revenue is left as operating income0%20%40%60%80%Q3 FY22: 37.6%Q4 FY22: 38.9%Q1 FY23: 22.5%Q2 FY23: 7.4%Q3 FY23: 10.1%Q4 FY23: 20.8%Q1 FY24: 29.8%Q2 FY24: 50.4%Q3 FY24: 57.5%Q4 FY24: 61.6%Q1 FY25: 64.9%Q2 FY25: 62.1%Q3 FY25: 62.3%Q4 FY25: 61.1%Q1 FY26: 49.1%Q2 FY26: 60.8%Q3 FY26: 63.2%Q4 FY26: 65.0%Q1 FY27: 65.6%Q2 FY27: 66.2%66.2%37.6%7.4%Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27 Q1 FY26: write-down of H20 chips for China ($4.5bn) because of export restrictions.
Free cash flow by quarter Operating cash flow minus capital expenditure, $bn; last five years 0204060Q3 FY22: $1.30bnQ4 FY22: $2.76bnQ4 FY23: $1.74bnQ1 FY24: $2.66bnQ2 FY24: $6.06bnQ3 FY24: $7.05bnQ4 FY24: $11.24bnQ1 FY25: $14.98bnQ2 FY25: $13.51bnQ3 FY25: $16.81bnQ4 FY25: $15.55bnQ1 FY26: $26.19bnQ2 FY26: $13.47bnQ3 FY26: $22.11bnQ4 FY26: $34.90bnQ1 FY27: $48.59bnQ2 FY27: $21.40bn21.401.30Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27 Q2 FY27: higher receivables and inventory ahead of the Vera Rubin launch.
Share buybacks and share count Last five years; top: cash spent on share buybacks, $bn; bottom: number of shares 05101520Q3 FY22: $0.00bnQ4 FY22: $0.00bnQ1 FY23: $2.00bnQ2 FY23: $3.35bnQ3 FY23: $3.48bnQ4 FY23: $1.21bnQ1 FY24: $0.00bnQ2 FY24: $3.07bnQ3 FY24: $3.81bnQ4 FY24: $2.66bnQ1 FY25: $7.74bnQ2 FY25: $7.16bnQ3 FY25: $11.00bnQ4 FY25: $7.81bnQ1 FY26: $14.10bnQ2 FY26: $9.72bnQ3 FY26: $12.46bnQ4 FY26: $3.81bnQ1 FY27: $19.31bnQ2 FY27: $19.73bn19.73Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27Shares outstanding at quarter end, billions24.024.525.025.5Q3 FY22: 25.380bn sharesQ1 FY23: 25.370bn sharesQ2 FY23: 25.160bn sharesQ3 FY23: 24.990bn sharesQ1 FY24: 24.900bn sharesQ2 FY24: 24.994bn sharesQ3 FY24: 24.940bn sharesQ1 FY25: 24.890bn sharesQ2 FY25: 24.848bn sharesQ3 FY25: 24.774bn sharesQ1 FY26: 24.611bn sharesQ2 FY26: 24.532bn sharesQ3 FY26: 24.483bn sharesQ1 FY27: 24.391bn sharesQ2 FY27: 24.285bn shares24.2925.38Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27 Shares: diluted weighted average for the quarter; Form 10-K does not give it for Q4.

Notes on the data: Status as of the morning of 12 Nov 2026, Central European time; the board’s decision on Huang and the Q3 FY27 results (17 Nov) are not yet known. Statements about the affair are taken from the media listed and from Nvidia’s official statements; they do not mean the claims have been confirmed. The pre-market price on 12 Nov (about $162) is not a close and is not used in calculations. Quarterly metrics are from XBRL data; a quarter is the difference between consecutive cumulative amounts for the fiscal year, and Q4 is the year minus the first three quarters; the Q2 FY27 values match the earnings release. Shares: diluted weighted average in Q2 FY25 (24,848m) and Q2 FY27 (24,285m); amounts before the 10-for-1 stock split in June 2024 are adjusted. The P/E ratios for this and next fiscal year are the $173.73 price divided by expected adjusted earnings per share of $9.32 and $15.93 (S&P Global). Analysts: 45 strong buy and 10 buy, 6 hold, 1 strong sell. ROIC is operating income for the last four quarters ($197.6bn) at a 17% tax rate, divided by invested capital on 26 Jul 2026 (equity and debt, minus cash, debt securities and investments in other companies; $115.1bn). The 63% decline in the stock is the fall in monthly closes from November 2021 to September 2022 (Yahoo Finance). Customer prepayments ($15.6bn in the first half of FY27) are from Form 10-Q.

Educational content, not financial advice. The author does not urge anyone to buy or sell any security. The data are taken from the sources listed above as of 12 Nov 2026 and may change.