Netflix reported its results for July, August and September (the third quarter) on 20 October, after the US market closed. It earned a little more than it had forecast in July. Net earnings per share, meaning profit after all costs and taxes divided across all shares, came to $0.87. The forecast was $0.82.
For October, November and December, Netflix expects revenue of $13.44bn. Analysts had expected slightly more, $13.51bn. It also cut its forecast for full-year advertising revenue from $3bn to $2.7bn. Even before the results, the stock was 44.7% below its highest price of the past 12 months.
In its shareholder letter, Netflix itself wrote what worries investors: viewing time, meaning how many hours people spend with its series and films. In the first half of the year that time grew only 2% compared with the first half of last year. Operating income, which is profit before interest and taxes, is forecast to be about 15% higher this year than last. Last year’s figure was reduced by a one-off charge from a tax dispute in Brazil, so we leave that charge out of the comparison. So Netflix is earning more and more even though people are not spending much more time with it.
The analysis therefore looks for the answer to one question: how long can Netflix keep earning more and more while people spend barely more time with it, and how much of that growth is already priced into the stock?
What Netflix said
First, July, August and September. Revenue was in line with what Netflix had forecast in July. Profit was somewhat above the forecast:
| July to September | Last year | Forecast (16 Jul) | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.51bn | $12.86bn | $12.87bn |
| Revenue growth | +17.2% | +11.7% | +11.8% |
| Operating margin | 28.2% | 33.2% | 34.6% |
| Earnings per share | $0.59 | $0.82 | $0.87 |
What does an operating margin of 34.6% mean? Out of every $100 of revenue, Netflix kept $34.60 after its operating costs. These costs include series and films, marketing, technology and administration. What is left is operating income: profit before the company pays interest and taxes. The margin beat the forecast mainly because some expenses came later than the company had planned.
Last year’s margin looks low because of a one-off charge. At the time, Netflix booked $619 million of expenses related to a tax dispute in Brazil. Without them, last year’s margin would have been 33.6%, only slightly below this year’s.
For a long-term investor, what Netflix expects next matters more. This is what it forecast on 20 October:
| Forecast of 20 Oct | Forecast | For comparison |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue, October to December | $13.44bn (+11.5% on last year) | analysts: $13.51bn |
| Operating margin, October to December | 26.0% (27.2% excluding layoff costs) | last year: 24.5% |
| Advertising revenue, 2026 | about $2.7bn | July: about $3bn |
| Free cash flow, 2026 | about $12.0bn | July: about $12.5bn |
The margin for the last three months of the year is lower because of layoff costs: in October Netflix announced it would cut about 6% of its workforce (more on this in the section on management). Free cash flow is the cash a company has left after paying all its costs and its investment in equipment and buildings. It can use that cash to buy back its own shares or repay debt. The forecast is lower mainly because of a real estate transaction expected to close by the end of the year.
The revenue forecast for the last three months is only half a percent below analysts’ expectations. So why does it matter? Because of advertising. Netflix has a cheaper plan in which members see ads while they watch. Money from those ads is meant to be its next big source of growth. Last year ads brought in a little over $1.5bn, and in January Netflix said it expected that to roughly double this year. It now expects about $2.7bn, a tenth less than in July. According to the company, the reason is that some new tools for advertisers are rolling out more slowly than planned. This year ads will bring in a little over 5% of total revenue.
Operating income, however, is still forecast to grow faster than revenue. For October to December, Netflix expects operating income about 18% higher than in the same months last year. Revenue is expected to grow 11.5%. How profit can grow faster than revenue is the core of this analysis.
Where growth comes from
First, where revenue growth comes from. Over the past few years Netflix has gone through a full cycle.
In 2022 and 2023 revenue growth almost stalled, at around 7% a year. Then three boosts kicked in at once. The first was paid sharing: since May 2023, anyone watching on someone else’s account has had to open their own, or the account owner pays extra for them. The second was price increases. The third was advertising, which in 2025 brought in more than 2.5 times as much as a year earlier. As a result, revenue grew by about 16% a year in 2024 and 2025.
This year it is forecast to grow 13%, and for next year analysts expect 11.2%. The boosts are fading and growth is returning towards 10%. The key question is therefore not this year, but next year.
This year growth rests mainly on new memberships and higher prices; advertising is still small. In the US, its largest market, Netflix raised the price of every plan at the end of March 2026:
| US plan | Monthly price before | From the end of March 2026 | Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard with ads | $7.99 | $8.99 | +12.5% |
| Standard | $17.99 | $19.99 | +11% |
| Premium | $24.99 | $26.99 | +8% |
Revenue in the US and Canada grew 11% from July to September, when the new price applied throughout for the first time, compared with the same months last year. Prices rose by 8 to 12.5%, and advertising adds a little more. That leaves little for new memberships, but this cannot be checked, because Netflix no longer publishes membership numbers.
Outside the US and Canada, Netflix earns 56% of its revenue and 59% of its revenue growth. Growth is easing there too. Excluding currency effects, meaning changes in the value of foreign currencies against the dollar, it slowed from July to September in all three regions.
New memberships are linked to viewing time, and this is where the tension Netflix itself acknowledged lies. Total viewing time grew only 2% in the first half of 2026, and 1.5% last year. If memberships grew 5%, each member would on average be watching for less time. If each member watches as long as before, there are hardly any new memberships. Which explanation is right is at the heart of the dispute between bears and bulls, meaning investors who expect harder times and those who expect growth.
So revenue growth is increasingly carried by prices and advertising, and less by new memberships. Yet profit is still growing faster than revenue. Why?
Why profit grows faster than revenue
The whole Netflix business rests on one feature: a series costs the same whether a hundred million households watch it or three hundred million. The cost of a series is fixed in advance, while revenue grows with every new membership and every price increase. In the accounts this cost is called content amortisation. Netflix does not book the payment for a series or film as a cost all at once, but spreads it over the years in which people watch it.
| Item | 2021 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.7bn | $45.2bn | +52% |
| Content cost | $12.2bn | $16.4bn | +34% |
| Operating income | $6.2bn | $13.3bn | +115% |
| Content cost as a share of revenue | 41.2% | 36.3% | −4.8 points |
| Operating margin | 20.9% | 29.5% | +8.6 points |
Between 2021 and 2025 content cost grew more slowly than revenue. As a result, of every additional dollar of revenue, 46 cents remained as operating income. This is how profit can grow even if people do not watch longer: it is enough that they stay subscribed and accept higher prices. It also works in reverse. In 2022 content cost grew 14.7%, while revenue grew only 6.5%. The margin fell at the time.
So the mechanism has one condition: revenue has to grow faster than content cost. In 2024 and 2025 the gap between the two growth rates was about eight percentage points. A percentage point is the difference between two percentages: between 13% and 10% there are three points. This year Netflix expects revenue to grow 13% and content cost about 10%. The gap is therefore narrowing to about three points.
This is already visible in the margin. Once last year’s profit is cleaned of the one-off charge in Brazil, it shows the margin widening ever more slowly:
| Comparable basis | Last year | This year | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating margin, January to September | 33.2% | 33.5% | +0.3 points |
| Operating margin, full year (2026 forecast) | 30.9% | 31.5% | +0.6 points |
| Operating income growth, full year | about 15% | the company cites more than 20% |
Netflix cites more than 20% because a one-off charge lowers last year’s base (all one-off items are in the next section). The mechanism still works, but with an ever smaller cushion. If revenue growth slips below content cost growth, the margin stops widening.
How much cash remains
Profit in the accounts is not yet money in the bank. So we also look at free cash flow: the cash left after all costs and investment. It shows something the margin does not.
| January to September | 2025 | 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Content cost in the accounts | $11.66bn | $12.76bn | +9.5% |
| Payments for new content | $12.04bn | $14.93bn | +24% |
| Free cash flow excluding the termination fee | $7.6bn | $7.2bn | lower |
This year Netflix paid 24% more for new content than last year. That is considerably more than it booked as a cost. The difference will reach costs in the coming years, as people watch that content. In the bank, however, it shows already: free cash flow is lower than last year, even though operating income grew by about 15%.
Netflix spends almost all of its free cash flow on buying back its own shares. It buys shares on the stock market and cancels them, so each remaining share represents a larger part of the company. This year it spent more on them than it generated in free cash, and covered the difference from cash. Approved buybacks not yet carried out amount to 7.7% of the value of all shares.
Some companies use buybacks only to cover the shares they give employees as part of their pay. Netflix is not one of them. Stock-based pay came to $405 million in nine months, about 4% of free cash flow. The number of shares, meanwhile, fell 3.3% in a year, so each shareholder owns a larger share of the profit.
This year’s figures are distorted by three one-off items that will not recur:
| One-off item | Amount | In this analysis |
|---|---|---|
| Tax dispute in Brazil (July to September 2025) | charge of $619m | excluded from last year’s profit |
| Warner Bros. termination fee (February 2026) | $2.8bn, $2.26bn after tax ($0.53 per share) | deducted from profit and cash |
| Real estate transaction (by the end of 2026) | outlay of about $0.5bn | kept as an actual outlay |
A termination fee is a payment a company receives when an agreed takeover falls through. Netflix received it in February 2026, when it walked away from buying part of Warner Bros. Discovery because it did not want to raise its offer. Without it, this year’s free cash flow is about $9.7 billion. Without the real estate outlay it would be about $10.2 billion.
Finally, three figures on how profitable and how risky the business is:
- Return on invested capital (ROIC) is about 38%. Every dollar that owners and lenders have put into the business generates about 38 cents of after-tax profit a year. The better-known return on equity (ROE) is less useful here, because buybacks and the termination fee inflate it artificially.
- Debt is small. Net debt, meaning debt minus cash, is $7.1 billion. That is just under half of one year’s operating income.
- Content is ordered in advance. Netflix has contractually committed to pay a further $25.2 billion for content. That is half of a year’s revenue, and it has to be paid even if viewers were leaving.
So the business is profitable and carries little debt, but it has to invest ever more money in content. What it gets for that depends on the people who choose the content. And Netflix has just replaced them.
Management changes direction
On 14 October Netflix announced it would cut about 6% of its workforce, the first time since 2022. According to the company, the aim is to free up money for investment where it matters most. A day later it announced that Bela Bajaria, who had been at Netflix for nearly ten years, most recently as head of content, is leaving. She will be succeeded by Peter Rice.
Netflix does not say why it made the change. Whom it chose says more. Rice most recently ran Disney’s television business, where series such as The Bear and Shōgun were made. Before that, as president of the Fox Searchlight studio, he released films such as Slumdog Millionaire and Juno.
Actions say more than statements. In September Wells Fargo named a lack of big original series as Netflix’s main problem. Netflix chose someone with exactly such series and films behind him. Bulls read this as an answer to the problem, bears as an admission that the content was not working. The first series under the new leadership will reach screens only in a year or two.
The question from the introduction therefore remains open: will people keep giving Netflix enough of their time for the mechanism to work? This is where opinions divide.
The bear case: viewers’ time is moving elsewhere
The bear case starts with viewers’ time, for which Netflix competes with everyone at once. It itself lists Alphabet (YouTube’s owner), Amazon and TikTok among its competitors. The research company Nielsen measures what share of their TV time Americans give to each service:
| Share of TV time in the US (Nielsen) | July 2025 | July 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| YouTube | 13.4% | 14.2% (record) | +0.8 points |
| Netflix | 8.8% (record) | 7.8% | −1.0 points |
The comparison is somewhat unfair to Netflix. According to Nielsen, July 2025 was its record month, with a new season of Squid Game. July 2026, by contrast, was marked by the end of the football World Cup. A drop of a full point therefore probably overstates things. That YouTube set a record despite the World Cup, however, remains a strong argument.
Netflix’s own data points the same way. In 2024 it cited about two hours of viewing per membership per day, and in the first half of 2026 it was about 1.6 hours (Engineering Investor calculation). So in September two banks downgraded the stock. Wells Fargo cut it to the equivalent of “sell”, with a price target of $57, meaning the price it expects in about a year. HSBC cut it to “hold”, with a price target of $76.
Since growth in the US rests mainly on price, the bear question is simple: how much further can Netflix raise prices before people start cancelling? The case runs through the same mechanism as above, only in reverse:
- Less viewing time makes a membership worth less to a household.
- A membership worth less is harder to raise in price and easier to cancel.
- Revenue growth slows, while content cost is fixed in advance.
- The fix is expensive: more original content, more licensed content and sport, or an acquisition.
The result would be a repeat of 2022, when content cost grew faster than revenue and the margin fell.
The bears are also helped by the fact that the case will become harder to test. Netflix no longer publishes membership numbers, and from 2027 its report on viewing hours will appear only once a year. The deeper reason for concern is cost: most content on YouTube is made by users themselves, so the risk that a series fails is borne by Netflix alone.
The bull case: the frightening numbers have another explanation
The bulls do not deny that viewing time is growing slowly. They argue, however, that the business is not suffering because of it.
If YouTube were taking members, it would show in cancellations. People do not cancel a membership because they also watch something else, but when it is no longer worth it to them. According to Netflix, however, members stayed loyal in every region from July to September, and in the US there were even fewer cancellations than last year despite the March price increase. Revenue growth in the US and Canada accelerated after the price increase, from 10 to 11%. The bear case has to explain why members are not leaving.
YouTube and Netflix complement each other more than they exclude each other. YouTube is a daily habit: podcasts, commentary, tutorials and short clips over lunch or on the go. Netflix is a place for stories, series and films that a household watches. Someone who spends more time on YouTube can keep Netflix for one series they follow. What decides is therefore the quality of Netflix’s content, not YouTube’s share.
Hours per membership fell because there are more memberships. This answers the simple example from the section on growth. When Netflix started charging for password sharing in May 2023, people who had watched on other people’s accounts opened their own. There were 260 million memberships at the end of 2023, and already 302 million at the end of 2024. These viewers’ time had already been counted in total hours, and now it was spread across more memberships.
Nielsen measures only TV sets in the US, while Netflix earns more than half its revenue elsewhere. In India, for example, viewing time grew 24% from July to September, and revenue 18% excluding currency effects.
Competitors are indebted. According to the Financial Times, Paramount and Warner Bros. Discovery will have about $80 billion of debt after their merger, which will make it harder for them to increase spending on content. Disney, meanwhile, has already started selling Netflix the rights to its films and series.
What analysts think
Most analysts remain on the bull side, but cut their price targets after the results:
| Analysts | Value | What it says |
|---|---|---|
| Number of analysts (S&P Global) | 52, consensus “buy” | Most remain on the bull side |
| Average price target | $91.39 | 33% above the price of $68.69 |
| Range of targets | from $57 to $126 | The highest target is more than twice the lowest |
After the results, BofA, UBS and Deutsche Bank were among the banks that cut their targets. Morningstar kept its fair value estimate for the stock at $80.
What the price already includes
All ratios are based on the last price before the results, $68.69 (20 Oct 2026), because the analysis is intended for long-term investors and does not follow price swings after the results.
The best-known measure is the ratio of the share price to earnings per share (P/E). It shows how many dollars you pay for one dollar of annual profit. Once the termination fee is removed, the stock is more expensive than it looks at first glance:
| At a price of $68.69 | As reported | Excluding the fee |
|---|---|---|
| P/E, last 12 months | 19.9 ($3.46) | 23.4 ($2.93) |
| P/E 2026 | 19.2 ($3.57) | 22.6 ($3.04) |
| P/E 2027 (analysts’ estimate) | 18.1 ($3.80) | 18.1 ($3.80) |
| Price/free cash flow 2026 | 24 ($12.0bn) | 28 to 30 |
The termination fee makes this year’s profit look higher and future growth look lower. Analysts’ estimate for next year is about 25% above this year’s earnings excluding the fee, but only 6% above reported earnings.
More useful than asking whether the stock is “cheap” is the question from the introduction, translated into numbers: what profit growth does Netflix need for a purchase at $68.69 to pay off?
The starting point is this year’s earnings per share excluding the fee, about $3.04. The chart shows what the annual return over five years would be. It depends on two things: how fast profit grows, and how many dollars per dollar of profit the market will pay in five years.
- 8% growth and a ratio of 15 → −0.5% a year.
- 12% growth and a ratio of 20 → 9.3% a year.
- 16% growth and a ratio of 25 → 18.4% a year.
What is realistic? Suppose revenue grows 10% a year and the margin stays the same. Together with share buybacks, that would mean earnings per share growth of about 13 to 14%. For more, revenue has to keep growing faster than content cost.
The market has already cut the ratio sharply in a year. According to Deutsche Bank, in June 2025 the stock traded at about 40 times expected earnings. Today it trades at about 18 times the earnings analysts expect for 2027. The price therefore already assumes slower growth.
This creates an asymmetry, meaning a difference between how much you can lose and how much you can gain. On the downside, the worst case in the chart gives a return of about zero, and a shrinking margin would mean a loss. On the upside, operating income is growing about 15% this year, and analysts expect earnings per share to grow even faster next year. If growth like that lasted several years, the return would move towards the favourable case. What will decide is whether Netflix has hits again.
For comparison with other investments: free cash flow excluding the fee and after stock-based pay amounts to about 3.2% of market value. That is what an owner would receive each year if the company paid out all its cash and stopped growing.
What to watch to know who is right
All five points are different views of the same question: can Netflix keep earning more and more while people spend barely more time with it?
- The gap between revenue growth and content cost growth. About three percentage points this year. If it disappears, the margin stops widening.
- Membership cancellations. Netflix describes them only in words, compared with last year and with its forecast. If they started to rise, that would be the first evidence for the bear case.
- Revenue growth in the US and Canada. +11% from July to September, mostly because of the price increase. When its effect fades in spring 2027, it will show how much new memberships contribute.
- Payments for content compared with the cost in the accounts. In nine months Netflix paid $1.17 for every dollar of content cost. If that ratio rises without revenue growth picking up, keeping viewers is becoming more expensive.
- Viewing time and the new chief’s first content. The next report on viewing hours comes out in early 2027, and Peter Rice’s first content in a year or two.
The next milestone is the results for October to December, which Netflix publishes in January 2027, together with its first forecast for 2027.
A conclusion everyone has to draw for themselves
July, August and September confirmed both stories at once. The business is working: revenue is growing by more than 10% in every region, the margin is still widening and the share count is falling. At the same time, growth is increasingly carried by prices, free cash flow excluding the fee is lower than last year, and Netflix itself has admitted that viewing time is growing only slowly, while revenue is growing fast.
Anyone who thinks slow growth in viewing time does not matter today pays about $18 for every dollar of the profit analysts expect for 2027. For that they get a business that earns about 38% on invested capital. Anyone who thinks it is an early sign of trouble sees $25 billion of content ordered in advance, prices that cannot be raised forever, and a margin that is widening by only a little over half a point a year. Which side is right will be shown by the gap between revenue growth and content cost growth, and by the new leadership’s first hits.
Notes on the data: Changes in the tables are calculated from unrounded amounts, so they may differ by a tenth from the difference between the values shown. Market value ($288 billion) is calculated from the diluted share count in the third quarter of 2026 (4,195 million) and the close of 20 Oct 2026. The effect of the termination fee on earnings per share is the fee ($2,800 million) after the effective tax rate of the first quarter of 2026 (19.3%), divided by the diluted share count in that quarter (4,298 million); the company does not give the exact after-tax amount. Free cash flow for 2026 excluding the fee is the company’s forecast ($12.0 billion) less the fee at the same tax rate ($2.26 billion). In April the company raised its forecast by $1.5 billion, “primarily” because of the fee; since that is a change in the whole forecast, not just the fee, the fee after tax is deducted instead. According to the company, tax on the fee was paid in the second quarter, so the fee after tax is also deducted for the nine months. The effect of the real estate transaction (about $0.5 billion) is the amount by which the company cut its forecast in October, primarily because of it. Stock-based compensation for the full year is annualised from nine months by a factor of 4/3. Earnings per share for 2026 is the sum of the reported $2.90 for nine months and the $0.67 forecast for the fourth quarter; growth against 2025 is calculated from $2.53. The reduction in the share count compares the diluted share count in the third quarter of 2026 (4,195 million) and 2025 (4,340 million). The titles of Peter Rice’s series and films are from Netflix’s announcement of his appointment (15 Oct 2026); the series were made under his leadership, and the films were released by the studio while he ran it. Fourth-quarter operating income growth (about 18%) is calculated from the company forecast ($3.50 billion) and last year’s result ($2.96 billion). Operating income growth in 2026 (about 15%) is calculated from the company forecast (revenue of $51.1 billion, operating margin of 31.5%) and last year’s operating income with the Brazilian charge ($619 million) added back. Fox 29 gives the plan prices before the increase as the prices after the previous increase; that most of the growth in the US and Canada can be explained by prices and advertising is an Engineering Investor inference, since the company does not publish membership numbers. The estimates for 2027 earnings ($3.80) and 2027 revenue ($56.96 billion) are the analyst consensus on stockanalysis.com on 21 Oct 2026. Analyst expectations for fourth-quarter revenue ($13.51 billion) are cited by Yahoo Finance and Investing.com without naming the consensus provider. ROIC is operating income for the last twelve months after the effective tax rate of the first nine months of 2026 (17.3%), divided by the average invested capital (equity plus debt, minus cash) on 31 Dec 2025 and 30 Sep 2026. Viewing hours per membership for the first half of 2026 are calculated from 97 billion hours, 181 days and 325 million memberships; since there are more memberships, the actual value is somewhat lower. Margin and operating income growth “excluding the Brazilian charge” are Engineering Investor calculations, not company figures. The 2026 content share in the chart is calculated from the company’s forecast. Nielsen’s shares apply to TV screens in the US and do not cover viewing on phones or in other countries. The return scenarios illustrate the arithmetic and are not a forecast.
This analysis was first published in Slovenian on 21 October 2026; all figures are as of 21 October 2026. Educational content, not financial advice. The author is not calling for the purchase or sale of any security. The data is summarised from the sources listed above and may change.